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Abstract In this paper we introduce some results about the appropriateness and eff ective-
ness of the Hungarian regional development policy: our main goal is to examine empirically 
its regional inequalities. Aft er a brief outline of the theoretical frame based on (new) economic 
sociology, we analyse several databases on more territorial levels and explore some opinions 
about the issue from personal interviews.
According to the results of the empirical analysis, the question of preferred status seems to 
be counter-fi nal due to the complex combination of the lack of resources. Th e respecting relation-
ships imply a kind of development trap, as it is worth becoming benefi ciary on the project level, 
because it means higher support rate and higher amount of support, but being in the preferred 
status has a negative eff ect aggregated on the micro-regional level, i.e. it is disadvantageous.
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0. Introduction
In this paper we introduce some results of our research concerning the relation between 
social inequalities and social policy. Th e general question whether social intervention can reach 
its goal – such as to reduce or eliminate some aspects of social inequalities – is widely examined 
in both national and international research projects.
In our PhD-research we investigated the appropriateness and eff ectiveness of Hungarian 
regional development policy. Our main goal was to answer empirically whether some mecha-
nisms result in counter-fi nal eff ect, and to demonstrate the regional inequalities of regional 
development policy.
In this paper we shortly outline the theoretical frame which can be successfully applied 
to interpret the connection of regional development policy and (territorial) inequalities on the 
basis of (new) economic sociology, and to demonstrate some results of our quantitative and 
qualitative empirical work.
Our research may be interesting as in the course of the quantitative secondary data analysis 
the problem is examined from an institutionalized point of view: we study whether the institu-
tional regulations and classifi cations generated and applied by the regional policy itself reach 
their aim. According to our assumption, they do not, so we expect the institutional regulation 
of regional development policy to cause unintended consequences.
To examine empirically the counterproductivity of development policy projects, we created 
complex databases on the project-, settlement- and micro-regional levels, and employ models 
that are capable to exclude the alternative explanations to gain high internal validity. We expect 
the empirical investiagation of the mechanisms underlying the counterfi nal eff ects of regional 
development policy to be fruitful for scholars and also policy-makers.
1. Short Th eoretical Introduction
In our research, we focus our attention on the patterns and territorial inequalities in the 
distribution of EU development funds (Crescenzi (2009), Lóránd (2011)). Th e paper presents 
some of the results of our empirical examinations of this issue. Th e relevance of this topic comes 
from the fact that from 2004 there are possibilities in Hungary too gain fi nancial supports off ered 
by EU development programmes, thus it is reasonable to expect unintentional consequences in 
respect of these resources’ distribution. During the exploration of this problem, building on the 
theory of the new economic sociology in the background, we interpret the system of develop-
ment policy as something that intends to help common goods to come into existence (Olson 
1997) – or rather to prevent the situation of common bad (see Hirschman 1995) to come into 
existence – when it employs institutional devices (Elster 1997) in order to enforce territorial 
equalization principle in the central regulation of the resources’ allocation (Stigler 1989). Our 
preliminary assumption is that the state fails (Tullock 2005) which causes counterproductive 
eff ects (Szántó 2006, Merton 2002). In the research, we considerably build on previous studies 
which discuss (Konrád – Szelényi 2000) and empirically show (Vági 1991, 1982) reproduction 
of inequalities in examination of domestic territorial development policy.
We can interpret the framework of the institutional system examined in general by Benedek 
(2006), on the level of the EU by Forman (2000), Kengyel (2008), Horváth (2001), Szigeti 
(2007) putting an emphasis on its special characteristics in Hungary. We argue that changes 
caused by joining the EU can be considered a strong institutional rearrangement (Csite–Kovách 
(2002), Kovách–Kuerová (2006), Kovách (2008)) but the main characteristics and patterns 
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of competing for development resources have not changed considerably; therefore questions 
raised by previous studies still remain (see Voszka 2006).
Th e novelty in setting these problems may be that institutional classifi cations are involved 
in the research that are fi xed as principles to be applied by the actual development policy. Th e 
main goal of our work was to examine the eff ect of these factors that is, to examine the fulfi l-
ment of aims which are set by the regulator itself. We do not intend to examine what eff ect the 
development funds have on certain economic-social problems. It would be diffi  cult to specify, as 
the change of settlement structure is considered to be a slow process, it cannot be interpreted by 
human standards (Fekete 2010. 35.). Th erefore we intend only to shed some empirical light on 
the distribution of development funds. In this way, the research may contribute to reveal some 
factors and mechanisms which determine the distribution of development policy resources on 
the one hand, and to helping future planning processes on the other.
2. Research Question
Th e actual question of the research to be presented below is whether the institutional 
regulation of the distribution of the European Union development funds in Hungary is success-
ful – taking into consideration its aim; i.e. to enable the less developed territories (settlements, 
micro-regions) of the country to absorb development funds. In order to reach this objective the 
government explores – using statistical data – the development level of every micro-region and 
according to these diff erences defi nes for every EU planning period the least developed micro-
regions and settlements of the country listed in a decree. Th e importance of the content of this 
decree comes from the principle of the EU-funds allocation mechanisms, namely that (only) the 
underdeveloped areas listed by the decree (preferred or favoured micro-regions and settlements) 
can apply for development projects with smaller ratio of own sources, i.e. with higher support rate. 
3. Methodological Description
In the analysis, we investigate empirically whether the regulation described above facilitates 
the absorption of development funds. To carry out the analysis, we have built – and aggregated 
on several diff erent territorial levels1 – complex statistical databases2 containing all the infor-
mation needed to fi ll the variables in this general model below:
Ŷ = b0 + b1×XR + b2…n×XC1…n
 1  While data-processing and interpretation of the results special attention should by payed to the fact that 
territorial analysis has its own methodology and system which is in connection with the use of statistic 
data in territorial analysis (see Dusek 2004., T.E. 2005.). Th is is because in the statistic analysis of territorial 
inequalities the indicators have diff erent values – that is they show minor or major inequalities – depending 
on what territorial unit we have as the basis of analysis. Th is mechanism coming from the choice of the given 
territorial unit is named scales eff ect (Dusek 2004. 115.). Th edirection of distortion is systematic and tenden-
tious – in the case of simple statistic methods and correlation. Using the same statistic method we can see that 
the higher aggregation level we investigate, the less territorial inequalities can be shown (Dusek 2004. 117., 
119.). Th e changeability of territorial units results in another problem, the zoning eff ect. It derives from the 
fact that a given territorial unit can be divided into subparts of the same number in alternative ways. Statistic 
analysis on alternative divisions results in diff erent degree of territorial inequality (Dusek 2004. 118–119). 
Th us it is needed to take into account these factors even if it is not referred or mentioned constantly during 
the analysis. 
 2  In the course of quantitative data analysis we do not present and refer to the p-values or signifi cance levels 
of the test results as we employ statistical data and there is not neccessary to further generalize to the ‘whole’ 
population, i.e. we examine the real situation.
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In the equation3 the dependent variable (Y) measured the amount of EU development funds 
allocated (source: downloaded from the webpage of National Development Agency, Hungary), 
the main explaining variable (regulation, XR) contained the information – coded in a dummy 
format – if the micro-region or settlement is a preferred micro-region or not (source: recoded 
from and according to the decree list). We applied a specifi ed impact analysis design (‘regression 
discontinuity design’) in the course of data analysis to ensure statistical control (see Moksony 
2005). Furthermore, we introduced more relevant statistical data4 (as control variables; XC1…n) 
on the actual regional level (source: downloaded and merged from the webpage of the Hungar-
ian Statistical Offi  ce) in order to reach higher level of internal validity (Moksony 1985), i. e. to 
control the estimation for as many alternative and potentially distorting explaining factors as 
possible and to measure the net eff ect of the regulation (Moksony 2006).
4. Results of Data Analysis
4.1 Selected Quantitative Results
Considering the results of the secondary statistical data analysis, the eff ect of being pre-
ferred seems to be frequently controversial, counter-fi nal in the light of the intended objectives.
Analysing the development fund indicators of the micro-regions of the Great Hungarian 
Plain – taking it as an example – the before mentioned experience can be seen well-marked in the 
case of the development-fund absorption rates of the preferred rural development micro-regions. 
Th e main question here is whether being classifi ed as preferred, favoured rural development 
micro-region provides better options to gain development funds (AVOP; Agrár- és Vidékfe-
jlesztési Operatív Program; ARDOP; Agrarian and Rural Development Operative Programme) 
which were directly designed to support rural- and agrarian investments. Th e results of Table 1. 
do not confi rm this presumption. Th e diff erence between the preferred and not preferred rural 
development micro-regions can be most easily seen, if we examine the last column of the table, 
the so-called ‘rural-development multiplier’, which we calculated as a ratio: the value belonging 
to the favoured rural-development micro-regions was divided by the value belonging to the not 
preferred micro-regions. So this simple indicator refl ects in one single number how the preferred 
micro-regions were more likely to acquire development funds. Aft er surveying these numbers, 
it can be seen that the highest diff erence between the micro-regions is in the case of the total 
amounts of the OPARD-funds: the preferred rural development micro-regions applied for only 
68 percent of the total amount of OPARD-fund applied by the non favoured micro-regions. Th at 
is, the micro-regions preferred because of their agrarian and rural profi le applied for a smaller 
share of agrarian- and rural development funds. However, the value of the rural development 
multiplier in the case of all the variables is under 1, so it can be concluded that the preferred rural 
development micro-regions perform regularly worse compared to the not preferred micro-regions 
in the case of rural development funds.
 3  To investigate the relations between the variables we mostly use comparison of means, logistic 
and linear regression method. Th e latter ones makes us capable to show the relation between 
variables with the help of a single indicator (Moksony 2006. 54.).
 4  We should take into consideration the role of this kind of statistical control as for casuality analysis real 
experiment is the most suitable method regarding internal validity doe to randomization. When we control 
alternative explanations statistically – that is, in the case of quasi-experiment tests – we get weaker internal 
validity. However ‘regression discontinuity design’ enables us to get a level of internal validity similar to the 
experimental methods but without the need of randomization (Moksony 2005. 99.).
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Table  v Diff erences of project absorption
Dependent variable Mean Standard deviation R.D.M.








Total amount of AVOP funds (HUF)
0 2 017 305 663,30 1 335 799 644,64
0,68
1 1 377 044 974,13 775 492 996,75
Total amount of AVOP funds won (HUF)
0 1 178 452 305,30 559 099 678,77
0,72
1 852 042 399,33 590 956 391,67
Abbreviations: 0 = not preferred rural development micro-regions, 1 = preferred rural development micro-
regions; R.D.M. = Rural Development Multiplier: the quotient of the values of preferred rural development 
micro-regions and not favoured micro-regions.
Source: Own calculation on a complex data-base containing the micro-regional level data of the National 
Development Agency.
In order to refi ne the previous results, we step down to micro-level data and examine 
directly the Regional Development Operative Program (RDOP) projects of the Hungarian De-
velopment Plan (HDP I.). Th ough the eff ect of the decree-level institutional regulation of being 
preferred or favoured seems to be also problematic: in Table 2. we presented the results of linear 
regression models estimating the eff ects of being preferred micro-region and preferred settle-
ment respectively on diff erent absorption indicators. Except for the variable of support rate, all 
of the ‘b’-coeffi  cients are negative, i.e. the preferred micro-regions and preferred settlements 
perform worse than their more developed partners. For example, a project-application coming 
from a favoured micro-region has nearly 37 millions HUF smaller contacted total sum of the 
investment on average – only to take the highest diff erence –, and if a project comes from a 
favoured settlement, it has 46 million HUF drawback on average taking the same – and in this 
case also the highest – indicator. Only the support rate is infl uenced in the expected, i.e. the 
offi  cially aimed positive direction: the projects of the favoured micro-regions have on average 
2,2 percentage higher support rate, and the projects of preferred settlement have on average a 
4,1 percentage advantage:
Table  v Eff ects of diff erent levels of regulation
Explaining variables. Dependent variable





Total sum of funds won Constant 215,601 213,060’b’ -19,492 -25,025
Granted total sum of the investment Constant 267,343 262,766’b’ -35,548 -45,816
Total sum of funds contracted
Constant 218,201 214,418
’b’ -22,814 -26,827
Contacted total sum of the investment Constant 268,234 263,140’b’ -36,891 -46,497




Source: Own calculation on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.
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We can unfold the connections above, if we analyse further the eff ects of the regulations 
separately. For this we use the variable ‘amount of funds paid’ as this is an indicator represent-
ing a realized and already absorbed fund, and fi rst take the preferred micro-regional status. Th e 
initial eff ect is again replicated by the results of the fi rst model (Table 3: M1): a project from a 
favoured micro-region has on average 25 million HUF smaller amount of fund compared to 
a project from a not disadvantaged micro-region. At the fi rst step, we calculated and included 
a new variable in the linear regression procedure (Table 3: M2) so as to control the impact of 
the factor arising from the obvious diff erences of the circumstances (for this we constructed a 
principal component containing several aspects of information – number of population, rate 
of unemployment, number of enterprises per capita – about the actual micro-region all at once. 
Th e results of this calculation show that aft er controlling for the features of the micro-region the 
eff ect of favoured status decreases to -8,6 million HUF, i.e. the disadvantage of the preferred – 
less developed – micro-regions may be explained partly by theit disadvantaged circumstances 
itself. But it can not be said that the drawback is fully due to these factors, as there is still a 
remarkable negative impact related to the preferred micro-regional status. In the next model, 
we applied another dimension of the development level of the micro-regions investigated: the 
rate of favoured settlement was treated as a new explaining factor. According to the results of 
this model estimation (Table 3: M3), the amount of funds paid is smaller (i.e. the eff ect of this 
variable is negative; -0,18 on average with every 1 percent) with a higher level of preferred – un-
derdeveloped – settlements in the micro-regions. But the more important outcome is that in this 
model also – now controlled for the share of underdeveloped settelements – the self-employed 
impact of being preferred micro-region is still negative: a project coming from a favoured 
micro-region – no matter how high or low the ratio of preferred settlements is – has smaller 
(‘b’= –16,067) amount of fund paid on average. Finally, we included in the estimation both of 
the former control variables beside our main explaining factor, and there seem to be again an 
unfavourable eff ect (Table 3: M4). Separated from the – in this fi nal model positive – eff ects of 
the features of micro-regions and the rate of underdeveloped settlemenst, the impact from the 
institutional regulation of being preferred micro-region is negative: a project from a favoured 
micro-region has an average nearly 11 million HUF less amount of funds paid compared to the 
more developed territorial units.




 constant and ‘b’ coeffi  cients (million HUF)
M1 M2 M3 M4
Constant 210,937 201,977 214,300 200,983
Xpreferred_micro-reg. –24,857 –8,605 –16,067 –10,733
Xdev.level of micro-reg. – 24,108 – 24,393
X rate of preferred settl. – – –0,183 0,048
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
Th e other control regulation concerning a lower territorial level (preferred status of settle-
ments lagged behind) shows similar disparities. In this case we also need to start the exploration 
of the eff ects from the basic two-variable model (Table 4: M5): it says that – as it can be seen 
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in the relevant part of table 2. – the projects handed in from a preferred / underdeveloped set-
tlement have on average almost 30 million HUF less total amount of funds paid. Controlling 
for the previously introduced micro-regional development-level factor (principal component), 
the extent of the drawback of the favoured settlements decreases (Table 4: M6) from the inital 
-29,4 value to -18,6 million HUF. Th e next model takes into consideration the other alternative 
explaining variable; the overall rate of settlements in a disadvantaged position (Table 4: M7). Th e 
results show that if we control for the relative frequency of favoured settlements in the micro-
region, a project coming from a preferred settlement has on average 22,8 million HUF less total 
amount of funds paid. And this dimension of disadvantage also seems to consist according to 
the results of the fi nal model (Table 4: M8) containing all the two alternative factors examined 
separately previously and the main explaining variable. In this case the average lack of funds 
paid for a project handed in from a lagging behind settlement – aside from the (positive) eff ects 
coming from the development features of the micro-regions and the level of underdeveloped 
settlement – is close to 27 million HUF.




constant and ‘b’ coeffi  cients
(million HUF)
M5 M6 M7 M8
Constant 206,883 203,335 210,945 196,981
Xpreferred_settlement –29,443 –18,612 –22,773 –27,733
Xdev.level of micro-reg. – 23,667 – 25,509
X rate of preferred settl. – – –0,139 0,208
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
Staying at the project level and using the same database of the Regional Development 
Operative Program (RDOP) we also calculated the so-called eff ect of interaction between the 
preferred settlement variable and support rate variable constructed by multiplying their values 
with each other as explicated below:
Ŷ=b0 + b1*Xpreferred_settlement + b2*Xsuport_rate + b3*XINTER   , that is
Ŷ=b0 + b1*Xpreferred_settlement + b2*Xsupport_rate + b3* Xpreferred_settlement*Xsupport_rate
Th is special kind of indicator measures the eff ect of one variable from the interaction in the 
function of the value of the other variable from the interaction. Th us the – symmetric – indica-
tor quantifi ed this way can inform us about the eff ect of one variable depending on the value 
of the other variable. In our analysis, the main focus is on the eff ect of the favoured status of 
settlements, so we rearranged the regression equation in order to estimate the impact of being 
a preferred settlement in the light of the value of the support rate – as presented below: 
Ŷ=b0 + b2*Xsupport_rate + (b1 + b3*Xsupport_rate)*Xpreferred_settlement
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Using this (b1 + b3*Xtam.arany.) formula we can calculate the actual value of the examined eff ect 
from the preferred status at every possible value of the support rate. Th e interaction eff ect itself 
is positive (‘b’=0,387), which means that with higher support rate a higher positive eff ect of the 
preferred status can be expected (this is illustrated in Figure 1. using a green line with positive 
slope). Th is relationship itself could be regarded as a fortunate result, as it would imply that if 
the support rate is high enough, then the disadvantaged settlements can benefi t more from the 
institutional regulation. However, if we calculate not just the interaction eff ect but the actual 
eff ects separately for the not preferred and the preferred settlements we can conclude that the 
positive eff ect is only a quasi positive eff ect. Actually the level of fund absorption is initially higher 
in the case of the more developed, i.e. not favoured settlements, and these applicants preserve 
their better position: although in the case of the preferred settlements the line representing the 
level of fund absorption is more steeped – due to the original positive value of the interaction 
eff ect –, this steepness is not high enough for the settlements lagging behind with preferred sta-
tus to catch up the more developed ones – at least in the range of realistic values of the support 
rate with a natural maximum of 100 percent. So it can be stated that although the eff ect of the 
interaction is positive at higher value of support rate, we witness a higher eff ect of the favoured 
status, it is still insuffi  cient to eliminate the drawbacks of the underdeveloped settlements – not 
to mention to enable the latter ones to overtake the settlements in better positions.
Figure  v Diff erences of fund absorption
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
So far we can conclude that both on micro-regional level and project level the eff ect of the 
institutional regulation offi  cially planned and expected to enable the areas in disadvantageous 
position to catch up for the less underdeveloped ones in the fi eld of the absorption of European 
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Union development funds proved to be unsuccessful. Th ese empirical results imply that the 
less developed applicants – no matter micro-regions or directly projects – are at a disadvantage 
during the competition to gain development funds. 
❖
Now, we turn to a special group of projects in the Hungarian development policy and ana-
lyze the so-called priority projects. Everyone may admit that the priority projects are rather a 
special kind of development intervention considering the fact that the decision about the refusal 
or acceptance of a particular priority project is taken by the government itself. So in this case 
there is not that kind of competition to acquire the fund as we may suppose it in the previously 
analyzed instances, rather there is some kind of administrative decision – even if we take into 
consideration the evaluation process itself during which two separate professional reviews are 
included with recommendation about being supported or not. Th ere is another angle why the 
priority projects can be regarded as extremely important policy instruments: “a priority pro-
ject is in priority because it contains such important development – either on a national or on a 
regional level – that can not be managed in other project budget due to its monetary dimension 
and uniqueness” (K.D. 2007).
Th e data of the priority projects can be achieved from a given part of the webpage of the 
National Development Agency in a single Microsoft  Excel table, which was supplemented during 
our work with further factors; additional variables from other sources. We assume that this infor-
mation is important to be shared, as the tables shared on the internet include only the status of an 
actual priority project: the result of the governmental decision whether the project is supported, 
must be improved further, or rejected. From this divide we created a dummy variable – with a 
value 0 indicating that the priority project was refused and with a value 1 indicating that the 
priority project was supported or it needs still some elaboration –, so in this analysis the main 
question and our dependent variable can only be the decision, more properly the probability of 
being supported. Accordingly, we will apply likelihood-ratio calculations and logistic regression 
models in the course of data analysis.
Th e fi rst numbers show the regional disparities of the possibilities of having a supported 
priority project: we assembled a simple cross-tabulation of the regional affi  liation and the status 
of support; furthermore we calculated and included in the last column the odds to be supported 
separately in every region. Th e values imply that there are great diff erences in the probability of 
winning a priority project (see Table 5.): in most cases of the regions the numbers are under the 
value 1 – the notable value which means that the likelihood of having a supported project and 
a rejected project is the same; values over 1 indicate bigger possibility to be successful at having 
priority projects accepted, and values under 1 signifying worse performance in this fi eld. So in the 
regions of Dél-Alföld, Dél-Dunántúl, Észak-Alföld, Észak-Magyarország and Közép-Dunántúl, 
the priority projects do not tend to be as fruitful as they are in the traditionally and well-known 
more developed regions – Közép-Magyarország and Nyugat-Dunántúl (in the latter cases the 
numbers are already twice as high; 1,8 odds to have a supported priority project) . Th us, it is 
obvious that it is more diffi  cult to have a granted priority project in the less developed regions, 
but the inequality becomes even more signifi cant, if we consider the diff erence between the odds 
of the group of regional priority projects and the national level priority projects: the national 
ones have more than 6 times higher odds to be supported.
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Table  v Regional diff erences of the odds of priority projects to be granted
In the cells shown: freqencies
Status
(government decision) Total
Odds of a priority 
project to be granted in 
the regionNot granted Granted
Regions
‘Dél-Alföld’ 100 37 137 0,37
‘Dél-Dunántúl’ 41 16 57 0,39
‘Észak-Alföld’ 85 56 141 0,66
‘Észak-Magyarország’ 50 44 94 0,88
‘Közép-Dunántúl’ 55 48 103 0,87
‘Közép-Magyarország’ 51 96 147 1,88
‘Nyugat-Dunántúl’ 40 73 113 1,83
National projects 17 105 122 6,18
Total 439 475 914 (1,08)
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
Besides the regional dimension of diff erences, we also analyzed the eff ect of territorial 
development on the odds of having an accepted priority project. Th e fi rst explaining variable in 
the related models was the proportion of the preferred micro-regions in the county from which 
the priority project was invited in the evaluation and decision-making process. According to 
the results of the logistic regression model (Table 6: M9), the eff ect caused by this so-called rate 
of underdevelopment is negative (‘b’= -1,7), but perhaps it is more eff ective for us to investigate 
the antilogarithm of the ‘b’ estimates, which transforms the raw ‘b’ values into the more easily 
interpretable odds ratio. Th us, it can be stated that there is – in this case as well – a remarkable 
inequality: with a higher proportion of preferred – i.e. less developed – micro-regions at the 
county level there is a lower odds ratio (‘b’ antilog.=0,18) to have a supported priority project. 
However, in the group of the counties where there are not any favoured micro-regions, there is 
a higher possibility of the priority projects to be accepted: numerically – as it can be seen from 
the value of the constant in the same logistic regression model – nearly twice as high odds ratio 
(‘b’ antilog.=1,95) can be measured; in other words it is much more likely to have a successful 
priority project in the more developed counties.
Th e other aspect of this territorial dimension is investigated from a less gradual point of 
view: we divided the units of analysis into two diff erent groups depending on the mean value 
of the variable: proportion of the preferred micro-regions in the county. For the projects above 
the cut point values were coded with 1 (signifying a higher rate of underdevelopment), and the 
other ones were coded with 0 (signifying the counties with less – under the average – lagging 
behind micro-regions) as described below:
If  x ≤ 50%,  then the value of the new variable = 0  (N = 402),
If  x > 50%,  then the value of the new variable = 1  (N = 407).
So this dummy version of the original variable may reveal more visible and more distinct 
diff erences. Applying the logistic regression model in this case fulfi lls this expectation (Table 
6: M10): although the raw ‘b’ estimate of the explaining variable is smaller than at the previous 
model, the antilogarithm of the indicator proves to be higher (‘b’ antilog.=0,32) and marks more 
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notable disparity. It means that if a priority project proposal is given in from a county where 
the maximum share of the favoured (underdeveloped) micro-regions is fi ft y percent, then it is 
one and a half times more possible to be supported – see the antilogarithm value of the ‘b’ in 
the case of the constant(=1,53) –, while in the case of the counties with higher rate of underde-
veloped micro-regions, the odds ratio is only 0,3 – i.e. it has only one-third likelihood to have a 
successfully accepted priority projects proposal.
Table  v Th e eff ect of the rate of underdeveloped micro-regions on the odds to be granted
(N = 809) b antilogarithm of b coeffi  cients
M9
Xproportion_of_underdeveloped micro-regions –1,699 0,183
Constant 0,667 1,948
M10
Xrate _of_underdeveloped micro-regions_dummy –1,149 0,317
Constant 0,425 1,529
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
As demonstrated by the empirical results above, it cannot be stated that the decision-making 
processes of development policy would be more egalitarian on a higher level; i.e. on the govern-
mental level: the priority projects also seem to lack any kind of spatially harmonizing impact. 
Rather, we had to face the fact that these particularly important and outstandingly expansive 
investments are more easily realized – or realized at all – by (co)fi nancing with European Union 
development funds in the more developed regions and areas of the country.
4.2. Results of the Qualitative Research: Responses from the Interviews I.
Based on the results of the personal interviews conducted with diff erent types of actors 
and stakeholders in the EU-funded project application system – self-government leaders and 
representatives of municipalities, project managers of micro-regional development associations, 
proposal-writers and project managers of project fi rms; i.e. members of the project class – we can 
shed some light on the factors behind the relations explored above, or the mechanisms laying 
in the background of the quantitative data.
According to the opinions of the respondents (see Figure 2.), the success of the application 
and project management can be traced back – on the one hand – generally to the scarcity of re-
sources. Th is scarcity of resources means in the fi eld of proposal writing and project generation 
itself the lack of own funds. As in the process of competition for development funds some of the 
participants – no matter if they are municipalities, enterprises or non-governmental organiza-
tions – do not possess privately the necessary fi nancial resources to complete their project budget. 
Th is shortage of resources is even aggrevated by the fact that these actors – just because of their 
disadvantaged circumstances – can obtain bank loans only limited or with restricted conditions 
– if they can at all – to complement their development projects and provide the own contribution. 
Th us, the results from the qualitative data highlight an objective impediment which is originated 
in the lack of resources. Th ere is even an opinion that the acquisition of the European Union 
development funds depends solely on the own fi nancial resources. Another dimension relating 
to this shortage of resources is the method of subsequent fi nancing, which – beyond the very 
existence (or lack) of the necessary private resources – demands the availability of further free 
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monetary frame to start and to fi nalize the fi rst phases; accounting periods of the projects. Th is 
problem emerges as an extremely important factor, as it does not concern the applicants of the 
excessively underdeveloped areas alone, rather it proves to be a complicating factor of the project 
funding system as a whole, impeding all the fi nancially less strong stakeholders.
Figure  v Results from the interviews
Source: Own categorisation and edition from the opinions in the interviews by ATLAS.ti
4.2.1. Related Quantitative Results
In order to investigate whether the disadvantage described above and directly caused by 
the monetary conditions generally pervade the project proposal system, it may be fruitful to 
analyze deeply the quantitative data. If the applicants struggling with the shortage of fi nancial 
resources are really lagging behind, it may confi rm the phenomenon explored in the interviews.
We use the data of the projects from the period of the National Development Plan (NDP 
I.; 2004-2006), as these can already been treated as closed, i.e. the trends appearing in the data 
may not change yet. In this case as well, we analyze all the supported projects without sampling 
(N=11720), but we excluded the ones which were funded without competition (the priority pro-
jects and the central projects). Th e complex multi-level calculations (see Table 7) provide a rather 
remarkable result about the question raised: the fi rst part (Table 7: M9) of the outcomes shows 
the eff ect of the preferred status of the micro-region on the support rate regarding the project 
level, and aggregated on the scope of the institutional regulation, i.e. micro-regional level. Th e 
values of the regression coeffi  cients imply that on project level both the applicants from preferred; 
i.e. underdeveloped micro-regions are at advantage – because their projects are realized with 
5,5 percentage higher support rate on average –, and aggregated on the micro-regional level the 
average level of support rate is higher (‘b’=8,4), as well. Th ese results confi rm that it is worth being 
favoured in the European Union funds based Hungarian project allocation system, because the 
preferred applicants can implement their projects with smaller own fi nancial resources – due 
to the higher support rate.
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Table  v Th e eff ect of preferred status on project and micro-regional level












































Source: Own calculation edition and aggregation on micro-regional level on a complex data-base containing 
the project-level data of the National Development Agency.
Th e further part of table 7. also reveals the positive impact of the favoured status where 
we estimated the eff ects on the total amount of funds paid (Table 7: M10-M10.c2). Th e latter is 
higher in the case of the projects coming from preferred micro-regions in the case of the two-
variable model and also in the models containing additional control variables. Th e estimation of 
the simple two-variable model (Table 7: M10) quantifi es the diff erence of the dependent variable 
– total amount of funds paid – when we shift  from the group of not preferred micro-regions to 
the group of the preferred ones. Th e extended model (Table 7: M10-M10.c1) – containing the 
fi rst additional variable; support rate – makes the same estimation simultaneously controlled 
by the aforementioned alternative explaining factor (support rate). In the fi nal model (Table 
7: M10.c2), we included another control variable – development level of the micro-region; a 
principal component constructed from 5 indicators as described earlier –, thus the coeffi  cients 
of this model present the net eff ect of being preferred micro-region – aside from the impacts of 
the value of the support rate and the micro-regional development level.
Th e results of the fi rst basic model (Table 7: M10) indicate that – on the project level – the 
eff ect of belonging to a preferred micro-region is positive: a nearly 19 million HUF higher amount 
of funds can be observed on average. Aft er controlling – the initially likewise positive – the ef-
fect of support rate (Table 7: M10.c1), the independent impact of the favoured micro-regional 
status decreases a little, but remains positive (‘b’=13,7). And in the fi nal model (Table 7: M10.
c2)– which estimates the eff ect of our main explaining variable, the values of the support rate 
and the development level of the micro-regions considered to be constant – there is still a posi-
tive eff ect: if a project is given in from a preferred micro-region, then the sum of funds paid is 
4 million HUF higher on average.
In so far, as all of the models investigated above are examined aggregated on the micro-
regional level, we obtain respectively the opposite results – that is, the eff ect is negative: only to 
mention the results of the fi nal model (Table 7: M10.c2) illustratively – aside from the positive 
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eff ects of the support rate and the context of the micro-regions – in the group of the favoured 
micro-regions the amount of funds paid is 357,6 million HUF smaller. Th is casts doubt on the 
advantageous impact of the institutional regulation of favoured micro-regional status because 
it means that when we move from the group of not preferred micro-regions to the group of the 
preferred ones, the average level of fund absorption is lower.
To sum up briefl y, the advantageous impact of being preferred micro-region can be de-
tected only on project level; on territorial level it seems to be rather a disadvantage. Th us, we 
may conclude that the results of the empirical research above reveal an essential problem of the 
project fund allocation system: it is worth being involved in the institutional regulation of being 
preferred on the project level, as an applicant – because this brings both higher rate of support 
and higher amount of funds paid in the projects. However, generally speaking, the micro-regions 
considered to be the accumulation units of drawbacks and inequalities can not reach any kind 
of advantages – thus generating a kind of trap in development policy. So to say the favoured 
status as an institutional regulation is advantageous and reaches its objective initially intended, 
but on territorial level its eff ect is not advantageous so it is in this respect counterproductive.
4.3. Results of the qualitative research: responses from the interviews II.
However, among the causes of lagging behind or being successful in the processes of project 
generation and fund absorption the factors – related to the fi nancial shortages and strengths – 
described above based on the interviews and also analyzed with quantitative methods can be 
regarded as only one of a more diff erently interdependent group of factors. In the opinions of the 
respondents, more elements could be discovered – connected to a diff erent aspect of the scarcity 
of the resources, too (see Figure 2). One of these elements is the lack of activities – organization-
ally separated – assisting and relieving the course of assembling project proposals, on which 
the investor or applicant can rely. Since the success of proposal writing and the phase of plan-
ning of projects needs and supposes – according to the respondents’ opinions – the availability 
of knowledge and skills which do not always exist in the case of all potential applicants. Th ose 
employees or staff  members who have already been handling such tasks for a long time are far 
more experienced with proposal documents and in this respect they have the know-how and 
expertise that is required to prepare these materials precisely and accurate.
It seems to be actually irrelevant whether this complexity of particular skills and knowledge 
is accessible within the organization itself – even as a separate proposal writing department, or 
just as a few staff  members specialized directly for this purpose –, or this knowledge is achieved 
as a service sold by the market in the form of tender or proposal writing companies. Th ese two 
options are equivalent from the perspective that both supposes the existence of – eventually 
fi nancial – resources. In this way – another – source or aspect of inequalities is created for those 
applicants being in less advantageous conditions. Th e proposal writing companies and their 
employees incorporated obviously wider, deeper and more extensive knowledge. And this can 
be taken into consideration as a cause for the respondents’ opinion which declared that it is not 
even rewarding for a smaller organization – for example a self-government of a small settlement 
or the small- and medium-sized enterprises – to employ or train colleagues who have expertise 
of every given area in depth, because on the one hand their education may be fairly expansive, 
and on the other hand it is likely that during their work it will be necessary for them to rely on 
their specifi c knowledge only rarely (project proposals with specifi c themes or areas are created 
only occasionally). Unlike the proposal writing companies – it can be much more promising for 
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them to invest into the training or employing of a person with experience and knowledge in a 
particular fi eld as this member of the staff  may carry out for diff erent clients the same kind of 
works and duties that require the specifi c knowledge.
4.4. Summary of the results
According to the secondary data analysis, counterfi nal patterns of the institutional regu-
lation of the European Union funds absorption could be explored: on micro-regional level (1) 
the preferred rural development micro-regions have a smaller rate of both projects and funds 
compared to the developed, i.e. not benefi ciary territorial units. Project level data of regional de-
velopment projects implied that (2) the support rate is infl uenced positively by the governmental 
regulation: in the preferred settlements and micro-regions the avareage level of support rate is 
higher, however (3) in both cases of micro-regional and settlement level, the eff ect of preferred 
status proved to be disadvantagesous: even in the control-variable models, the projects from 
preferred territorial units have on avarege smaller amount of funds paid than their developed 
counterparts. Th e (4) positive value of the interaction eff ect can be regarded as favourable out-
come, although a higher value would be more desirable, as the overall tendencies show that this 
advantage of the underdeveloped, i.e. preff erred settlements is not high enough to help the less 
developed ones to catch up. In the case of the especially remarkable priority projects (5), a clear 
regional dimension of inequality could be measured concerning the odds to have a granted 
projects and the (6) distribution of the underdeveloped micro-regions seemed to be a signifi cant 
factor in this case as well: the higher presence of preferred micro-regions decreased the odds of 
the proirity projects to be granted. Th e results of the qualitative research (7) revealed three main 
factors infl uencing the success of development project absorption: besides the indispensable 
economic capital a kind of cultural or human capital, furthermore social resources or personal 
relations prove to be neccessary elements. In the light of the qualitative research results (8) the 
institutional regulation seemed to work as a kind of development trap: some more detailed 
analysis on diff erent levels revealed a controvesial role of the preferred status.
5. Conclusions
Above we introduced some results about the appropriateness and success of the Hungarian 
regional development policy – our main goal was to answer empirically whether mechanisms 
resulting in counter-fi nal eff ects can be explored, i.e. to demonstrate the regional inequalities of 
regional development policy. Aft er shortly outlining the theoretical frame by interpreting the 
connection of regional development policy and (territorial) inequalities on the basis of (new) 
economic sociology, we carried out analysis on several databases on more territorial levels and 
explored some opinions about the issue from personal interviews.
According to the results of the empirical analysis, we can conclude that both on micro-
regional level and project level the eff ect of the institutional regulation of the absorption of 
European Union development funds – offi  cially planned and expected to enable the areas in 
disadvantageous position to catch up with the less underdeveloped ones – proved to be unsuc-
cessful. Th ese empirical results imply – in accordance with the related EU-level results (Bradley 
2006, Crescenzi 2009, Esposti – Buselotti 2008, Martin–Tyler 2006) – that during the 
competition to gain development funds the less developed applicants are at a disadvantage. More 
precisely, the quantitative (secondary statistical analysis) and qualitative (interviews) outcomes 
show that preferred status seems to be counter-fi nal due to the complex combination of the lack 
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of resources. Moreover, the respecting relationships imply a kind of development trap, inasmuch 
it is worth becoming benefi ciary on the project level, because higher support rate and sum of 
support can be achieved, but on micro-regional level the impact of being preferred is negative, 
i.e. disadvantageous.
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